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Abstract
Summary
Frank Furstenberg examines how the newly extended timetable for entering adulthood is affecting, and being
affected by, the institution of the Western, particularly the American, family. He reviews a growing body of
research on the family life of young adults and their parents and draws out important policy implications of
the new schedule for the passage to adulthood.
Today, says Furstenberg, home-leaving, marriage, and the onset of childbearing take place much later in the
life span than they did during the period after World War II. After the disappearance of America s well-paying
unskilled and semi-skilled manufacturing jobs during the 1960s, youth from all economic strata began
remaining in school longer and marrying and starting their own families later. Increasing numbers of lower-
income women did not marry at all but chose, instead, non-marital parenthood?often turning to their natal
families for economic and social support, rather than to their partners. As the period of young adults'
dependence on their families grew longer, the financial and emotional burden of parenthood grew heavier.
Today, regardless of their income level, U.S. parents provide roughly the same proportion of their earnings to
support their young adult children.
Unlike many nations in Europe, the United States, with its relatively underdeveloped welfare system, does not
invest heavily in education, health care, and job benefits for young adults. It relies, instead, on families'
investments in their own adult children. But as the transition to adulthood becomes more protracted, the
increasing family burden may prove costly to society as a whole. Young adults themselves may begin to regard
childbearing as more onerous and less rewarding. The need to provide greater support for children for longer
periods may discourage couples from having additional children or having children at all. Such decisions
could lead to lower total fertility, ultimately reduce the workforce, and further aggravate the problem of
providing both for increasing numbers of the elderly and for the young. U.S. policy makers must realize the
importance of reinforcing the family nest and helping reduce the large and competing demands that are being
placed on today's parents.
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 On a New Schedule: Transitions to
 Adulthood and Family Change
 Frank F. Furstenberg Jr.
 Summary
 Frank Furstenberg examines how the newly extended timetable for entering adulthood is
 affecting, and being affected by, the institution of the Western, particularly the American, fam
 ily. He reviews a growing body of research on the family life of young adults and their parents
 and draws out important policy implications of the new schedule for the passage to adulthood.
 Today, says Furstenberg, home-leaving, marriage, and the onset of childbearing take place
 much later in the life span than they did during the period after World War II. After the disap
 pearance of America s well-paying unskilled and semi-skilled manufacturing jobs during the
 1960s, youth from all economic strata began remaining in school longer and marrying and start
 ing their own families later. Increasing numbers of lower-income women did not marry at all
 but chose, instead, non-marital parenthood?often turning to their natal families for economic
 and social support, rather than to their partners. As the period of y?ung adults' dependence
 on their families grew longer, the financial and emotional burden of parenthood grew heavier.
 Today, regardless of their income level, U.S. parents provide roughly the same proportion of
 their earnings to support their young adult children.
 Unlike many nations in Europe, the United States, with its relatively underdeveloped welfare
 system, does not invest heavily in education, health care, and job benefits for young adults.
 It relies, instead, on families' investments in their own adult children. But as the transition to
 adulthood becomes more protracted, the increasing family burden may prove costly to society
 as a whole. Young adults themselves may begin to regard childbearing as more onerous and less
 rewarding. The need to provide greater support for children for longer periods may discourage
 couples from having additional children or having children at all. Such decisions could lead to
 lower total fertility, ultimately reduce the workforce, and further aggravate the problem of pro
 viding both for increasing numbers of the elderly and for the young. U.S. policy makers must
 realize the importance of reinforcing the family nest and helping reduce the large and compet
 ing demands that are being placed on today's parents.
 www.futureofchildren.org
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 The striking changes in the tim
 ing and sequencing of adult
 transitions charted by other
 articles in this volume have
 been accompanied by equally
 dramatic transformations in the institution of
 the family. In this article I examine how the
 Western, and most particularly the American,
 family is affecting and, in turn, being affected
 by the newly extended social timetable for
 entering adulthood. I review a growing body
 of social science research on the family life of
 young adults and their parents that identifies
 a set of puzzles and issues that require fur
 ther investigation, and take note of the enor
 mous policy implications of this new schedule
 for the passage to adulthood, not just for the
 family but also for the larger society.
 During the final third of
 the twentieth century, the
 institution of the family did
 undergo a radical shift in
 form and function for reasons
 that social scientists still only
 partially understand.
 I begin by identifying some of the sweeping
 changes in Western family systems?in the
 institution of marriage, in gender-based divi
 sions of labor, and in the meaning of parent
 hood?that have complicated and extended
 the life course of young adults. I then address
 young adults' lengthening co-residence
 with their parents, a topic that is attracting
 increasing research interest. Next I explore
 family formation patterns among young
 adults: the move from the natal family to
 what used to be called the "family of procre
 ation," though that term is becoming obsolete
 because of the sizable fraction of couples
 who remain childless. After briefly examining
 intergenerational exchanges among young
 adults and their parents, I conclude with a
 brief discussion of policy issues that arise
 from the changes in early adulthood and
 the family. Clearly, this is a larger bundle of
 issues than can be fully addressed in a single
 article, but I want to highlight what research
 ers have learned so far and what remains to
 be discovered to inform policy choices that
 promote both successful young adult transi
 tions and the long-term welfare of families.
 The Changing Family and
 the Changing Course of
 Early Adulthood
 Contrary to a popular misconception that
 Western family systems have only recently
 undergone widespread change, the form and
 function of the family in the West have been
 changing for as long as reliable records exist.1
 Marriage, fertility, patterns of parent-and
 child co-residence, parenting practices, and
 indeed virtually anything that can be mea
 sured by family demographers and historians
 have fluctuated over time. As economic
 conditions, demographic patterns, cultural
 beliefs, and social institutions have varied, the
 family has responded and adapted. In this
 sense, the "traditional" family has no golden
 past.2 But during the final third of the twenti
 eth century, the institution of the family did
 undergo a radical shift in form and function
 for reasons that social scientists still only
 partially understand.
 The advent of "the post-modern family,"
 as it is sometimes called, has been marked
 by sharp increases in women's labor force
 participation, a gradual breakdown of the
 gender-based division of labor, a precipitous
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 Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, October, 1961,1970,1980,1990, 2000, 2007.
 fertility decline (owing in part to postpone
 ment of marriage and parenthood and in part
 to the growing number of childless couples),
 and rising rates of divorce, cohabitation, and
 nonmarital childbearing.3 Many converging
 forces helped to alter family practices. Rising
 levels of education among women provided
 a growing demand for employment after
 marriage. Economic pressures to maintain
 or increase consumption propelled women
 into the labor force. Improved contraception
 allowed women to postpone childbearing.
 Ideological changes led to increased demands
 for equality in the marketplace and at home.
 The confluence of these forces reinforced a
 decline in the patriarchal family, which had
 persisted well into the twentieth century in
 the West and still prevails in many regions of
 the world.4
 Many of these same social, economic, techno
 logical, and cultural changes have also been
 prolonging early adulthood.5 Although family
 scholars have not explicitly linked family
 change and the new schedule of adult transi
 tions, there are many reasons to believe that
 the two are closely related. All the conditions
 implicated in transforming the family during
 the final third of the twentieth century have
 helped to delay and complicate the passage
 to adulthood. For example, the advances in
 women's education that have been linked to
 their growing participation in the labor force
 also tend to delay marriage and parenthood.6
 Young people today, men and women alike,
 aspire to jobs that require postsecondary
 education. It simply takes more time than it
 did even a half-century ago to gain a job that is
 secure enough to form and support a family.7
 Couples do not invariably wait to marry or to
 have children until they complete their school
 ing or get a secure job, but they have more
 compelling reasons to do so than they did in
 the years after World War II, when it was still
 common to enter full-time, relatively well-paid
 (often union) work before completing high
 school, much less college. It follows, then,
 that marriage and the onset of childbearing
 generally take place far later in the life span
 than they did in the postwar period, because
 a growing proportion of young adults realize
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 Figure 2. Proportion of Youth Living at Home, by Age Cohort, 1960-2007
 i9?r: 19^0 :--r'.--^ a?o& -2007
 Sources: U. S. Census Bureau, 1960 Census of Population, PC(2)-4B, table 2; 1970 Census of Population, PC(2)-4B, table 2; 1980
 Census of Population, PC80-2-4B, table 4; Current Population Survey, March and Annual Social and Economic Supplements, 1990,
 2000, and 2007.
 they cannot make sound family decisions until
 their economic fortunes are established.8 Fig
 ure 1 shows the increase in the share of young
 adults remaining in school. Figures 2, 3, and 4
 show the dramatic delays in the age of home
 leaving, marriage, and childbearing in the
 United States. Similar trends can be observed
 in Canada and Europe.9
 It is probably no coincidence that the expan
 sion of higher education beginning in the late
 1950s corresponds with the rising age of first
 marriage in the United States, as it did in
 Europe a decade later. Beginning in the
 1960s, the decline of manufacturing jobs also
 began to undermine the prevailing pattern of
 early marriage in the United States. As
 well-paying unskilled and semi-skilled jobs
 disappeared, the single-earner family became
 less tenable for most Americans. Education
 through high school and beyond was no
 longer a luxury but a necessity for both men
 and women who aspired to middle-class
 employment and earnings.
 Perhaps related to the delay of marriage,
 young people, and women in particular,
 began to engage in sexual relationships
 earlier and with no immediate intention to
 marry. The availability of reliable birth
 control for women and access to legal
 abortion no doubt made it possible for young
 people to escape the seemingly inevitable
 consequences of sex. As marriage age
 climbed, fewer young adults who became
 pregnant elected to marry, in part because
 they had begun to feel that settling down into
 family life so early was undesirable.10 Family
 demographers and sociologists have also
 argued that the rising marital instability
 during the 1960s and early 1970s, tied to
 early marriage and shotgun weddings, made
 young people more sensitive to the risks
 associated with a hasty decision to marry.
 Women, in particular, became more con
 cerned about having enough education and
 work experience to support themselves
 should they remain or become single.11
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 Figure 3. Proportion of Youth Married, by Age Cohort, 1950-2007
 0 _ s , , ?> .. _
 1950 1960 1970. > 1980 1990 2000 2007
 Sources: Historical Census of the United States, Millennial Edition Online, edited by S. B. Carter and others (Cambridge University
 Press, 2006), table Aa614-683: Population, by Marital Status, Sex, and Race: 1880-1990; U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population
 Survey, March 2000 and 2007.
 The growth of the consumer economy,
 stimulated by advertising and mass market
 ing, may have also contributed to the desire
 of couples to increase their earning potential
 before marrying. Although solid evidence is
 lacking on couples' perceptions of what they
 need to set up an independent household, it
 is likely that the demand for more material
 goods and the perceived and actual cost of
 rearing children affected couples' choices
 about whether and when to marry and have
 children. Overall, childbearing became a
 more conscious decision as new forms of
 contraception allowed, or perhaps even
 required, couples to make deliberate choices.
 Moreover, as women became more indepen
 dent, they began to take more control over
 family building, timing parenthood to fit their
 expanded roles in the household economy.12
 Finally, childrearing itself changed as
 parents began to view their responsibilities
 differently. Men were under greater pres
 sure to become actively involved as parents,
 perhaps feeding into the belief that it was
 better to wait to have children.13 Some
scholars have argued that parents began to
 perceive the importance of investing in
 "quality" children who could compete in a
 gro ing skills-based economy.14 The growth
of in quality in the United States beginning
 in the 1970s may have also contributed to
 he perception that, for children to succeed
 later in life, parents must invest more in
 them over a longer time span.15 Early
 autonomy from the natal household, so
 valued at mid-century, gave way to a longer
 period of co-residence. Parents, it appears,
 incr asingly believe that their children need
 their support longer than they did a half
e ury ago, and youth feel less compelled
 to leave the natal home in late adolescence
 and their early adult years.16
 I have sketched some of the overlapping
 ources of change in family patterns and in the
 length of adult transitions without reference to
 variations in gender, ethnicity, or social class.
 VOL. 20 / NO. 1 / SPRING 2010 71
This content downloaded from 165.123.108.74 on Wed, 07 Jun 2017 18:37:42 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Frank F. Furstenberg Jr.
 Figure 4. Proportion of Female, Ever-Married Youth with at Least One Child, by Age Cohort,
 1950-2006
 40
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 Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, Census of the Population: 1950 Special Report, Fertility, Part 5; Census of the Population: 1960
 and 1970, vol. 1, Characteristics of the Population, Part 1, U.S. Summary; Current Population Survey, June, 1980,1992, 1998,
 2002, 2006.
 Although I will address some of these differ
 ences later, some general comments about
 these variations are appropriate here.
 Men and women have become more alike
 over the course of the past century in how
 they move into adult roles.17 Class differences,
 however, have increased.18 Youth from all
 economic strata are remaining in school
 longer and marrying later, but young adults
 from less-advantaged households are finding
 it increasingly difficult to adhere to an orderly
 and predictable sequence of education,
 full-time employment, home-leaving, cohabi
 tation or marriage, and parenthood.19 In more
 privileged families, youth more often adhere
 to the traditional sequence but take far longer
 to complete the demographic milestones of
 successful passage to adulthood and remain
 financially dependent on their parents while
 they complete their education.20 In short,
 young adults without resources find it difficult
 to attain independence on the traditional
 (early) schedule, while those with ample
 family support spend more time gaining
 necessary credentials to become economically
 self-sufficient. Dependency on parents for
 both the advantaged and disadvantaged
 sometimes extends late into the third decade
 of life, albeit for different reasons. In either
 case, the financial and emotional burden on
 families has grown in ways that were almost
 unimaginable just a half-century ago.
 Changing Patterns of Co-Residence
 and Home-Leaving
 The impression that American youth are
 remaining at home much longer now than
 they once did, while not inaccurate, is
 nonetheless often exaggerated in the mass
 media.21 As shown in figure 2, the period of
 co-residence with parents has lengthened
 notably since the 1960s, when youth left
 home at a very young age. Todays home
 leaving patterns are, in fact, much closer
 to those of the early 1900s. But though the
 two patterns are similar, the driving forces
 behind them are very different: more young
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 adults remained with their parents longer at
 the beginning of the twentieth century not
 because they were dependent on them but
 because they were obliged to contribute to
 the family economy.22
 All the increase in the age of home-leaving in
 the United States since the 1960s is attribut
 able to delayed marriage.23 Unmarried young
 adults are, of course, more likely to reside
 with their parents than those who wed. Con
 sequently, with couples marrying later, youth
 in their late teens and early twenties moved
 out of the home more slowly than they had
 during the postwar years when couples
 married earlier. This trend is especially
 pronounced if young adults are continuing
 their education, as was the case during the
 decades of the 1970s and 1980s. The rate of
 co-residence declined slightly between 1990
 and 2000, perhaps because a strong economy
 during much of the 1990s afforded young
 adults the opportunity to move out on their
 own, although co-residence with parents will
 likely increase during the first decade of the
 century owing to the recession of 2008.
 The trend toward a later exit from home in
 the United States parallels that in almost all
 Western nations, although with considerable
 variation, particularly in Europe. In the
 Nordic countries, for example, youth leave
 home in their late teens, largely owing to
 the availability of state support. By contrast,
 lack of state support and long-standing
 cultural norms favor an extended period of
 co-residence among youth in Mediterranean
 nations, lasting for men into their mid-thirties.24
 Here in the United States, nearly half of all
 young adults in their late teens and early
 twenties still live with their parents. That
 fraction drops below one in seven by the late
 twenties and below one in ten by the early
 thirties.25 By international standards, Ameri
 cans still leave home relatively early. Women
 are typically younger than men when they
 leave home because they complete college
 earlier, form cohabiting unions earlier, and
 marry about two years earlier, on average,
 than men. Regionally, co-residence is substan
 tially higher among families in the Northeast
 than elsewhere, likely because of the higher
 costs of housing, higher rates of college
 attendance, and later entry into full-time
 employment.26 The rapid growth of immigrant
 families may have also contributed to the
 rise of co-residence in the early adult years,
 although as Rub?n Rumbaut and Golnaz
 Komaei note in their article in this volume,
 this trend would probably emerge only among
 second-generation immigrants because
 foreign-born residents often migrate in their
 early adult years without their families.
 Whereas cohabitation or marriage is generally
 associated with earlier home departure, single
 parenthood often works in the opposite
 direction: young mothers who do not enter a
 union before bearing a child typically remain
 in the parental home for several years and
 receive financial support and child care from
 their parents. Indeed, the federal Temporary
 Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) pro
 gram and parallel state assistance programs for
 young parents have required co-residence for
 teen mothers, a policy that was aimed both at
 restricting public assistance and at assuring
 greater parenting supervision for children of
 young mothers. Whether young parents and
 their children do better if they remain in their
 natal home is an unsettled question. In a
 longitudinal study of teen parents in Balti
 more, I found that mothers and their children
 did better if they lived with the young moth
 er s parents for one or two years, but if they
 failed to move out thereafter, they fared
 somewhat worse, perhaps owing to differences
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 between the families that moved out and
 those that remained at home.27
 In general, youth are more likely to remain at
 home when their biological parents are still
 living together. In particular, divorce and
 remarriage among parents have been associ
 ated with earlier home-leaving among young
 adults and with earlier provision and receipt
 of assistance.28 Youth who grow up living with
 their mothers only are distinctly less likely to
 receive help from or provide assistance to
 their fathers in later life, while children
 growing up apart from their mothers are not
 as likely to curtail contact and exchange with
 their mothers when they reach adulthood. In
 short, divorce and remarriage tend to create a
 matrilineal tilt to kinship ties in the United
 States.29
 Research has documented not only the
 lengthening of home-leaving but also the
 quality of the relations between co-residing
 parents and young adult children. Studies
 report that bonds are close, particularly when
 the young adults are on a clear path toward
 moving out. For example, those who remain
 at home in their early and mid-twenties get
 along better with their parents when they are
 studying, working, or looking for work than
 when they are having serious difficulties
 moving toward independence.30 Results of the
 third wave of the Add Health study, a nation
 ally representative, longitudinal sample of
 young adults between the ages of twenty and
 twenty-four, reveal that relations with mothers
 are closer than those with fathers, particularly
 nonresident fathers (authors tabulations).
 This finding, replicated in numerous studies,
 indicates the partial withering of paternal
 relationships outside of marriage.31 To some
 degree, paternal involvement remains some
 thing of a "package deal" that comes with
 marriage or at least cohabitation.32
 Few studies, however, have examined the tex
 ture of family life when young adults reside
 in the natal household. For example, what
 kinds of rules, routines, and understandings
 emerge regarding household obligations,
 expenses, and the comings and goings of
 young adults and other family members?
 Qualitative reports from parents and youth
 and perhaps analysis of time diaries would go
 a long way in filling this gap. The media fre
 quently speculate about the irresponsibility
 of youth in their dealings with their parents,
 but very little solid evidence substantiates the
 presumed tensions.
 What happens inside families on a day-by
 day basis when young adults co-reside with
 their parents remains a largely unexplored
 topic. Whether parents provide continued
 guidance, set expectations, and provide
 assistance in promoting development after
 the adolescent years is a topic for further
 research. Both anecdotal evidence and stud
 ies of parental spending give every reason
 to believe that parents continue to invest
 heavily, both financially and emotionally, in
 their young adult children. What is lacking is
 good qualitative evidence on how parents and
 young adults work things out.
 Along this same line, researchers know more
 about the timing of home-leaving than about
 how either young adults or their parents
 manage the process.33 For example, how
 much do young people consult or involve
 their parents in the decision to leave, and
 how much advice, support, and resources
 do parents provide as young adults depart?
 Analysts could learn a great deal about the
 impact of the process on both young adults
 and their parents by following both parties
 during and after the departure from the
 home. According to census data, of every
 six young adults who move out, one moves
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 back in at some point before age thirty-five.34
 Reverse transitions appear to be occasioned
 by financial setbacks, career changes involv
 ing a return to school or bouts of unemploy
 ment, and the dissolution of cohabitation and
 marriages.35 Sharon Sassier and her col
 leagues conducted one of the few qualitative
 studies on the strategies of managing a return
 to home. The study reveals the dilemmas of
 economic dependency in early adulthood for
 both parents and youth, as well as the ways
 that young adults cope with receiving support
 from their parents while still psychologically
 considering themselves "adults."36 Renegoti
 ating authority inside the family turns out to
 be a challenging task when youth continue to
 rely on their parents for economic support,
 though it appears that many learn ways of
 achieving greater equality inside the family.
 Whether and how this negotiation differs in
 the households of the foreign-born is a ques
 tion that merits further attention.
 Differing Pathways to Family
 Formation among Young Adults
 In the recent past, the maturational steps of
 leaving home and marrying were tightly
 sequenced.37 During the middle years of the
 twentieth century, young people left home to
 marry and have children as soon as they had
 the wherewithal to do so, and not infre
 quently before they had adequate resources
 and secure employment.38 Today the process
 of family formation (entering unions and
 having children) has become less orderly and
 more protracted.39 The onset of sexual
 relations and marriage today is typically
 separated by at least five years, and often
 more. Cohabitation, and sometimes parent
 hood, occurs in the intervening years.
 Marriage has become a culminating event,
 still indicating social maturity, but social
 maturity increasingly occurs well before
 marriage.40
 The process of family formation today, more
 than in the recent past, is shaped by educa
 tion and employment opportunities,41 And
 now, more than ever, the sequence and
 timing of family formation in the United
 States differs sharply by socioeconomic
 status. Family formation has long differed in
 timing and sequence (for example, pregnancy
 or parenthood before marriage) between
 poor and less-educated youth and better-off
 youth who manage to complete college.42 But
 now, despite consistent evidence that young
 adults, regardless of social class, continue to
 endorse the importance of marriage and
 parenthood, there is a growing perception
 among less-advantaged youth that marriage is
 less attainable.43
 Nonetheless, youth and parents from less
 advantaged families continue to favor an
 earlier departure from the home than do
 those of more advantaged means.44 Advan
 taged youth are far more likely to attend a
 residential college and possibly graduate
 school (which the Census Bureau classifies as
 still living with parents), enjoying a period of
 semi-autonomy that may or may not include
 part-time work and cohabitation. By contrast,
 youth from lower-income families, if they
 attend college at all, are likely to do so while
 still residing with their parents.45
 Complicating the home-leaving process for
 lower-income youth, particularly women, is
 the growing likelihood of non-marital parent
 hood. Forty percent of all first births now
 take place outside marriage, and almost all
 are to young women who have not completed
 college. Although rates of teenage pregnancy
 and childbearing have declined during the
 past fifteen years (until 2006, that is), nearly
 half of all young adults with a high school
 education or less become parents in their late
 teens and early twenties.46 These pregnancies
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 are generally unplanned, and relatively few
 of the parents are fully prepared to take on
 the economic responsibilities of supporting a
 family. Data from the Fragile Families Study,
 a long-term examination of family forma
 tion among largely young, largely poor urban
 couples who are having a child, reveal the
 fluidity of the relations between the partners
 over time.47 Although a substantial minor
 ity of nonmarital births to young adults is to
 couples who are cohabiting at the time of the
 pregnancy, these unions often are ephemeral,
 only rarely resulting in marriage, even though
 most young parents in the Fragile Families
 Study profess a desire to wed eventually.48
 In the past, most of these young parents
 would have wed before or shortly after the
 birth of the child. Today, however, they
 perceive, correctly given the evidence, that
 the benefits of a hasty marriage are few.
 Many of the fathers lack job experience, are
 beset by mental health problems, or have
 been involved in the criminal justice system.49
 For economic and social support, young
 mothers often turn to their families rather
 than to their partners, who cannot provide
 steady assistance. In a long-term study of
 teenage mothers in Baltimore, I found a deep
 pessimism, especially among the parents of
 the pregnant teens, about the wisdom of
 relying on the men who fathered their
 children. As one mother told her daughter,
 "It don't do your child no good if his father
 can't take care of him."50
 In recent decades, a growing number of
 low-income and less-educated white and
 Hispanic couples have joined African Ameri
 cans in forming families before they are
 economically independent.51 Thus, the
 traditional ordering of school, employment,
 home-leaving, and family formation has
 broken down for an ever larger share of youth
 growing up in less than advantaged circum
 stances. Compared with the relatively weak
 bonds established between sexual partners
 and even prospective parents, bonds with
 natal families among these young adults are
 strong, particularly their reliance on families
 for economic assistance and practical help in
 childrearing. In the Baltimore study, it was
 common for young parents to remain at
 home and coordinate child care with their
 parents. And many of the young children in
 turn regard their grandmothers as a, if not
 the, primary parent figure in their lives.
 Fathers often continue to see their children,
 but over time, many become shadowy figures
 in their lives, creating further difficulties in
 the early adult years.52
 Youth from disadvantaged
 circumstances with limited
 prospects for a well-paid job
 or a partner with solid
 earnings increasingly opt
 for cohabitation, which
 has become a weak form
 of matrimony.
 Among disadvantaged African Americans,
 marriage often takes place, if it does at all,
 long after the onset of childbearing and
 following a series of cohabitations. This
 pattern is becoming common as well in other
 disadvantaged racial and ethnic minorities,
 though considerable variation exists by ethnic
 and national origin. A study I conducted with
 Rachel Margolis found that this pattern of
 delayed marriage after childbearing is
 emerging among less-educated whites as
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 well, suggesting that socioeconomic status is
 linked to the decision to postpone marriage
 even when childbearing occurs.53
 Youth from disadvantaged circumstances
 with limited prospects for a well-paid job or
 a partner with solid earnings increasingly opt
 for cohabitation, which has become a weak
 form of matrimony. More than ever, cohabita
 tion provides a temporary basis for childbear
 ing and childrearing, but its major appeal is
 that it does not require a high level of com
 mitment or even contentment. Nonetheless,
 as noted earlier, for most, marriage remains
 the ultimate or preferred status, a symbol of
 economic success often deferred long after
 parenthood.54
 The contrast in how college-educated young
 adults (most of whom are also from more
 affluent families) form families is striking.
 In-depth interviews with nearly 500 young
 adults in four sites conducted by the Mac
 Arthur Network on Transitions to Adulthood
 show that most college-educated young
 adults complete their education and gain
 some work experience before marrying and
 certainly before having children.55 Like
 their less-educated counterparts, these
 well-educated couples also cohabit for
 lengthy periods before marrying, but such
 relationships typically do not result in parent
 hood, presumably because of more reliable
 contraceptive practice, sometimes backed up
 by abortion.56 It is still quite rare for affluent
 couples to have a child outside of marriage,
 although a few elect to have children in
 common-law or consensual unions.57
 The search and commitment process among
 highly educated young adults provides time
 to test the durability of relationships.58
 Acquiring the "marriage mentality," as some
 better-educated young people explained in
 in-depth interviews, requires time and
 experience that is often acquired by living
 together.59 In short, the pattern of forming
 marriages and deciding whether and when to
 have children has become more deliberate
 among well-educated young adults. This
 slower pace may be paying off: evidence is
 accumulating that marital dissolution among
 the highly educated has declined over time.60
 Researchers know far less about the family
 formation patterns of young adults who grow
 up in families with modest resources, many
 of whom obtain some college or complete an
 associate s degree. There is likely more vari
 ety among the middle stratum in the timing
 and sequence of marriage and parenthood.
 It would be useful to investigate how these
 young adults manage both to move away
 from home and to establish their own fami
 lies. They face some of the hazards of family
 formation experienced by low-income and
 less-educated youth, such as unplanned par
 enthood, but they possess greater resources
 to manage more stable unions.
 Family formation in the United States today
 differs not only by social class but also by
 geographical region. Throughout large parts
 of the South and Midwest, young adults still
 follow the early marriage patterns of previous
 generations, dictated in part by traditional
 and religious values.61 To a considerable
 degree, these values collide with the eco
 nomic and emotional realities of contempo
 rary life that make marriage a more difficult
 undertaking than it was a half-century ago. At
 that time couples were perhaps more will
 ing to put up with less-than-perfect unions
 because they were unprepared or unwilling
 to divorce. At least one study finds that young
 adults sort themselves according to who
 remains in the community and who leaves to
 get higher education or seek work. The less
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 educated "stayers" often subscribe to an early
 schedule of family formation while those who
 move to urban areas or out of state adopt a
 pattern of later marriage and parenthood.62
 Families with higher incomes
 contribute more in material
 assistance, although, measured
 as a share of income, lower
 income families still provide
 considerable support.
 The family formation patterns, not to men
 tion co-residence patterns, of gay young
 adults largely remain unexplored by research
 ers. Over time, there is reason to expect that
 enough data will accumulate to permit a
 direct examination of this hitherto invisible
 segment of the young adult population. It
 is an open question whether they adopt the
 same timing for forming lasting relationships
 and, now, increasingly entering parenthood,
 as their heterosexual counterparts.
 Relations between Young Adults
 and Their Parents across
 Households
 The prolongation of adult transitions raises
 a series of questions about how relation
 ships change as young adults move out of the
 household, and how patterns of material and
 emotional assistance between young adults
 and their parents are altered by living apart.63
 Long-term data, as noted, are best suited
 to investigating how exchange patterns are
 altered as young adults make the passage to
 adulthood. Several long-term studies such as
 Add Health and the Panel Study of Income
 Dynamics (PSID) have recently included
 modules on intergenerational transfers,
 providing much-needed information on
 exchanges between young adults (living both
 inside and outside the home) and their par
 ents. These data are just becoming available,
 so most of what researchers know comes
 from information that may incompletely
 reflect the relatively recent extension of early
 adulthood.
 Analyzing data collected in the PSID in 1988,
 Robert Schoeni and Karen Ross find that
 parental support for a young adult was
 substantial even two decades ago.64 For their
 adult children between the ages of eighteen
 and thirty-four, parents provide, on average,
 $2,200 a year in todays dollars. Put differ
 ently, parents' economic contributions to
 their children amount to an additional
 one-third of what they spend during the first
 eighteen years of their children's lives.
 Financial assistance declines from a high of
 nearly $3,500 a year between age eighteen
 and age twenty, to about $2,300 annually
 from age twenty-five to twenty-six, to a little
 more than $1,500 a year by the early to
 mid-thirties. Time contributions by parents
 are similarly high during the early adult years,
 trailing off in the late twenties and early
 thirties.65
 Family contributions increase in large part
 because of education and longer periods of
 time in the household. As might be pre
 dicted, families with higher incomes contrib
 ute more in material assistance, although,
 measured as a share of income, lower-income
 families still provide considerable support.
 There is little or no difference by social class
 in time contributions.66 From the growing
 research on the determinants of intergenera
 tional transfer, analysts know that parents are
 more willing to provide support for children
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 with special needs, for educational advance
 ment, in times of immediate crisis such as
 unemployment or union dissolution, and for
 children who have children themselves.67
 The Long-Term Consequences
 of Later Adulthood: Some
 Unaddressed Policy Issues
 Parents who are called on to provide eco
 nomic and emotional assistance during a
 more protracted period of their children's
 semi-dependency may wonder whether these
 investments will erode or enhance their own
 economic security later in life. Arguably,
 greater transfers to their children reduce
 parents' savings for retirement, but they
 might also prompt children to return greater
 assistance to their parents later in life.
 Whether rising parental concerns about the
 adequacy of Social Security and pensions will
 reduce their investment in young adults
 remains an open issue. Martin Kohli and
 several colleagues are finding from their
 analysis of European data that the flow of
 assistance from parents to children persists
 into the latter decades of life.68 That trend
 holds true both in northern Europe, where
 autonomy comes relatively early, and in
 southern Europe, where it comes far later.69
 Researchers can learn much from such
 cross-national comparisons about the societal
 determinants of interfamilial exchanges.70
 Social security systems in both Europe and
 North America have permitted parents to
 provide financial aid to their offspring for a
 longer period. Does the generosity of the
 welfare system in providing aid to elders,
 support for education, and living expenses to
 young adults have consequences for patterns
 of investment by parents in their young adult
 offspring? And how in turn does the generos
 ity of the welfare system affect patterns of
 exchange later in life?
 The United States devotes relatively little
 public spending to supporting young adults.
 Spending for higher education, health
 care, and job benefits is meager to mod
 est, although such investments appear to be
 increasing in the Obama administration. The
 relative paucity of public support has placed
 a heavier burden on families during young
 adults' increasingly protracted and uncertain
 transition to independence. The burden is
 particularly heavy for the families of vulner
 able young adults, those with special needs
 and limited resources, whose families may
 be unable to provide necessary assistance
 after they reach the age of majority.71 In this
 country, much of the media attention about
 the prolongation of early adulthood has been
 directed to what is happening in affluent fam
 ilies. Far less is known about what happens
 to less well-off youth as they navigate the
 passage to adulthood, and particularly about
 the critical role that parents play (or fail to
 play) as their children struggle to complete
 their education, enter the labor market, form
 relationships, and have children.
 The analysis by Schoeni and Ross revealed
 that a large fraction of parents extend
 assistance to their children in the early adult
 years and that, regardless of income, parents
 provide roughly the same proportion of their
 family income. That assistance, however, may
 be insufficient to meet the needs of grown
 children because many low-income parents
 simply lack the resources to give much in
 the way of direct financial assistance. When
 families cannot help out, youth are often left
 to flounder on their own. There is a press
 ing need for publicly provided health care,
 education and training, and social services for
 youth whose families cannot support them as
 they navigate the passage to economic self
 sufficiency.
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 At a societal level, the United States and the
 rest of the developed world face a growing
 policy dilemma: the need to invest in chil
 dren and youth while continuing to support
 the economic, health, and social needs of a
 growing population aged sixty-five and older.
 The dilemma has been largely managed so
 far by family exchange from the elderly to the
 young. The current public system of support
 for seniors is underfinanced, however, and
 many observers are talking about the need to
 reduce Social Security benefits to preserve
 the system. Cutting back on those benefits,
 though, may have unforeseen consequences
 for the ability of parents to invest in their
 young adult children. With less support from
 their parents, the middle generation may
 be required to cut back on their support for
 their own children to help out their parents.
 Low-income families, especially, may face
 competing demands from elderly parents and
 their young adult offspring.
 Is it possible that the new job description for
 parents?the requirement that they provide
 greater support for children over longer
 periods?might discourage couples from hav
 ing additional children or even having chil
 dren at all?72 It does not seem farfetched to
 suggest that couples may begin to factor the
 long-term responsibilities of rearing children
 into their planning for their own retirement.
 If the economic burdens of rearing children
 become intolerable, potential parents may
 elect not to assume those costs. Such family
 decisions would lead to lower total fertility
 and ultimately reduce the workforce, thus
 further aggravating the problem of providing
 both for the elderly and for the young.
 Conclusion
 That the passage to adulthood has become
 more protracted and the sequence of tran
 sitions less orderly and predictable is well
 documented. Although I have touched on
 some of the reasons why the timetable has
 changed, I have emphasized the conse
 quences of the change for young adults, their
 families, and the larger society.
 Social scientists, having relied for too long on
 anecdotal reports from the mass media about
 the direct effects of the later transition to
 adulthood, are now conducting their own
 independent research. So far, though,
 researchers still know far more about the
 demography and economics of the change
 than about its implications for family life and
 practices. Recent evidence from the General
 Social Survey shows that families generally
 accept that it now takes their children longer
 to pass the milestones that mark economic
 independence and social maturity. How
 parents and their young adult offspring are
 managing this longer period of co-residence
 and economic dependency remains less well
 understood. More fine-grained information
 on daily routines, rules and understandings,
 and exchanges of time, money, and support
 among co-resident parents and children
 should make it possible to chart how this new
 timetable for growing up affects the family.
 It also remains to be seen whether and how
 this period of semi-autonomy (or semi
 dependency, if the glass is seen as half empty)
 changes the path of psychosocial develop
 ment. Using new and more discriminating
 measures of development during the early
 adult years, analysts will be able to examine
 more directly whether and how the experi
 ence of adult transitions fosters psychological
 development, a topic that has remained
 largely unexplored.
 The new schedule of adulthood has compli
 cated family formation itself, particularly for
 the less-advantaged members of American
 society. Moving out of the natal household
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 has become precarious for those with limited
 means. Unlike the not-so-distant past, when
 marriage provided an easy (though not always
 a successful) route out, fewer young adults
 today are willing to commit to a permanent
 union, in part because they lack the resources
 and the mind-set to settle down and in part
 because they lack confidence that marriage
 provides the security that it once did. These
 conditions help to explain why parenthood
 now often precedes marriage for many young
 adults growing up in disadvantaged house
 holds. By contrast, for youth from advantaged
 families who are able to complete college,
 the extended period of growing up brings few
 costs and many benefits. The longer educa
 tional process provides greater opportunities
 for self-exploration, including the search for
 stable life partners. Delaying marriage and
 parenthood, it appears, results in wiser mar
 riage choices and consequently more stable
 family situations and more positive environ
 ments for childbearing and childrearing. This
 class divide in the early adult transition risks
 reinforcing social advantage and disadvantage
 in family formation in the next generation.73
 The body of research on the connections
 between young adults and their parents
 across households is growing. Clearly, parents
 continue to channel support and economic
 assistance to their adult children after they
 leave home. But exactly how, when, and
 why do parents extend help, and how is it
 reciprocated in both the short term and the
 long term? Much also remains to be learned
 about how such family assistance affects
 both the givers and the receivers of help.
 How intergenerational exchange is affected
 by the distribution of resources in the larger
 society also requires more investigation. I
 have argued that the United States, with its
 relatively underdeveloped welfare system,
 relies more on the family to invest in young
 adults than do many nations in Europe. The
 heavy burden placed on families may come
 at a price if young adults begin to regard
 childbearing as too onerous and perhaps
 not sufficiently rewarding. Although there
 may be no immediate policy prescription for
 addressing this problem, it is essential to rec
 ognize the importance of strengthening the
 family nest and reducing the immense and
 competing demands that are being placed on
 todays parents.
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